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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Frank Donald Marks appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdicts finding him guilty of three counts of lewd conduct. Marks claims the 
district court erred in making certain evidentiary rulings and abused its 
sentencing discretion. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The state charged Marks with three counts of lewd conduct for sexually 
molesting three different victims - two biological daughters, B.M. and K.M., and 
his stepdaughter, C.M.1 (R., pp.44-45; Tr.2, p.792, Ls.2-3, p.800, L.7 - p.804, 
L.24, p.886, Ls.11-14, p.891, L.25 - p.895, L.19, p.1025, Ls.19-23, p.1029, L.13 
- p.1 034, L.2.) Marks pled not guilty and the first trial resulted in a mistrial due to 
a deadlocked jury. (R., p.262.) Before the second trial, Marks entered a guilty 
plea to one count of lewd conduct pursuant to a plea agreement with the state, 
but the court allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing and the 
case proceeded to trial a second time. (R., pp.417-423, 456-457, 460-462, 464-
465.) 
At the conclusion of the second trial, the jury found Marks guilty of all 
1 Although C.M. is referred to as Marks' stepdaughter, Marks was only engaged 
to C.M.'s mother; they were never married. (See Tr., p.791, Ls.6-7, p.794, Ls.2-
15.) 
2 There are three transcripts included in the record on appeal. The transcript that 
includes the trials, sentencing, and several hearings will be referred to as "Tr."; 
any other transcript references will be based upon the date of the hearing. 
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three counts of lewd conduct. (R., pp.641-642.) The court imposed concurrent 
life sentences with 30 year fixed. (R., pp.664-667.) Marks filed a rule 35 motion, 
which the district court denied. (R., pp.668, 689.) Marks filed timely notices of 




Marks states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err, and violate Mr. Marks' constitutional 
rights to due process, to present witnesses, and to present a 
defense, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment, when 
it prevented his medical expert from testifying at trial? 
2. Did the district court err when it permitted the presentation of 
404(b) evidence? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed 
concurrent, unified life sentences, with thirty years fixed, 
following Mr. Marks' convictions on three count of lewd 
conduct, especially in light of his having passed two 
polygraphs concerning the charges? 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when, in light of the 
new information provided, most notably the fact that the 
victims felt the sentences were too harsh, it denied Mr. 
Marks' Rule 35 motion? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Marks failed to establish the district court abused its discretion in 
denying his motion to have a doctor, who never examined any of the victims, 
testify that one of the victims was not sexually abused? 
2. Has Marks failed to show error in the district court's determination that 
testimony from a fourth daughter abused by Marks was permissible pursuant to 
I.R.E.404(b)? 
3. Has Marks failed to show the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion by imposing concurrent unified life sentences with 30 years fixed upon 
the jury verdicts finding Marks guilty of engaging in lewd conduct with three of his 
daughters? Has Marks likewise failed to show an abuse of discretion in the 




Marks Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Excluding His Proposed Expert Testimony 
A. Introduction 
Marksasserts the district court "erred, and violated his constitutional rights 
to due process, to present witnesses, and to present a defense, under the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments when it prevented his medical expert from 
testifying at triaL" (Appellant's Brief, pA.) More specifically, Marks contends the 
court erroneously prohibited Dr. Stephen Guertin from testifying, based on his 
review of medical records, that K.M. was not sexually abused given the lack of 
any indication that her hymen was transected as he would expect if Marks had 
vaginal intercourse with her as she alleged. (Appellant's Brief, pp.14-16.) Marks 
also asserts that, "to the extent that the Rules of Evidence do apply to bar Dr. 
Guertin's testimony, ... they must yield to his constitutional rights to due 
process, to present witnesses, and to present a defense under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments." (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) Marks' claims fail. The 
district court properly exercised its discretion in excluding Dr. Guertin's testimony 
and Marks is incorrect in his assertion that his constitutional rights trump 
evidentiary rules. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The decision whether to admit evidence at trial is generally within the 
province of the trial court." State v. Healy, 151 Idaho 734, 736, 264 P.3d 75, 77 
(Ct. App. 2011). A trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony will 
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not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 645, 962 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1998); State v. Winn, 121 
Idaho 850,855,828 P.2d 879,884 (1992). 
C. Marks Has Failed To Show Error In The Exclusion Of Dr. Guertin's 
Testimony 
Prior to the second trial, Marks disclosed that he intended to call Dr. 
Stephen Guertin as an expert. (R., p.313.) Dr. Guertin set forth his opinion in a 
letter in which he concluded: 
In short, I believe that there are credibility issues with [S.M., K.M. 
and C.M.]. Some, I believe, are extreme. I don't know if a physical 
examination of [C.M.] was ever done, but certainly a normal 
examination of the external genitalia of [K.M.] would not be what 
one would expect given allegations of hundreds of episodes of 
penile/vaginal intercourse beginning during the prepubertal period. 
It would be interesting to me, as well, to know whether or not your 
client, Mr. Franks, was willing to take a lie detector test and/or what 
the results of it were. More so, would be interesting to know 
whether or not any of these teenagers were asked to take a lie 
detector test, what their responses were to these requests and/or 
the results. 
(R., p.348.) Dr. Guertin's opinion was based on his review of police department 
records, "preliminary trial transcripts from July 2009," "the jury trial transcripts 
from June 2010" of S.M., K.M., and C.M., and medical records for S.M., S.K.M., 
and K.M. (R., p.341.) With respect to his review of the victims' medical records,3 
3 The disclosure and proper use of the victims' medical records was the subject 
of debate before the district court. (See,~, Tr., pp.520-532; R., pp.287, 291-
93, 311, 336-339.) The court ultimately authorized release of those records for 
review by Dr. Guertin and those records have been augmented to the record on 
appeal as confidential exhibits. (R., p.311; Order Granting Revised Motion to 
Augment the Record dated May 10, 2013 (italics original).) 
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Dr. Guertin noted (1) B.M.'s "anogenital examination" on July 27, 2009, "was 
completely normal"; (2) B.K.M.'s examination on the same date was also 
"normal"; and (3) the "examination of [K.M.'s] external genitalia, which should 
have included an examination of the hymen, was norma!." (R., p.346.) Dr. 
Guertin further commented that B.M.'s "physical examination neither confirms 
nor negates [her] allegations" but he would expect that the sexual activity 
recounted by K.M. would have resulted in a "complete transaction of the hymen," 
which should have been noted in the medical record. (R., p.347.) Dr. Guertin 
also found it "notable that a speculum examination of [K.M.] could not be done" 
since, according to Dr. Guertin, "a child who had had recurrent episodes of 
penile/vaginal intercourse, extending up through age 13 years or so, it would be 
expected that a speculum could be admitted without discomfort." (R., p.347.) 
Dr. Guertin did not, however, have the results of a planned examination of K.M. 
under anesthesia. (R., p.348.) 
The state filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Guertin, asserting 
the medical records upon which Dr. Guertin relied were privileged and that Dr. 
Guertin was not qualified to offer an expert opinion since he never examined any 
of the victims. (R., pp.336-351.) At the hearing on the state's motion to exclude, 
the court found that Marks failed to meet his burden of establishing Dr. Guertin's 
testimony was admissible but gave Marks additional time to file a brief and 
submit authority to support his position. (Tr., p.586, L.21 - p.588, L.13.) 
In response, Marks filed a "Brief in Support of Expert Witness." (R., 
pp.360-369.) Marks argued Dr. Guertin's testimony was "proper under Idaho 
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Rules of Evidence 702 and 401," was "not excludable under Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 503," and claimed he had a constitutional right to present Dr. Guertin's 
testimony. (R, p.360.) More specifically, Marks asserted, in relevant part: ''The 
key issue for the jury to decide is whether or not the alleged victims are telling 
the truth .. " [H]aving available exam records, that the court has previously 
deemed forensic exam records, and having an expert testify about the lack of 
physical evidence is relevant for the jurors to hear."4 (R, p.363.) The state 
again objected and the court held another hearing. (R., pp.383-387; see 
generally Tr., pp.591-603.) At that hearing, Marks made the following proffer in 
addition to referencing Dr. Guertin's opinion letter: 
[Dr. Guertin] will testify that he has been involved in alleged sexual 
assault and sexual abuse cases and done exams. He will testify as 
to the standard protocol of what is to be done as with the medical 
procedure when a person has alleged sexual assault. He will 
testify about his review of the medical records, what was done and 
what was not done and what is there in the findings in those 
medical reviews. 
. .. I think it's clear the part of his opinion that talks about 
the standard protocol as to what's done medically, what a medical 
exam has done in these cases and what was and was not done in 
this case and what was done, what it showed. 
(Tr., p.597, Ls.1-13.) 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied Marks' request to allow 
Dr. Guertin to testify (Tr., p.598, L.21 - p.601, L.8) after which the court and 
defense counsel engaged in the following exchange: 
4 Marks also argued he had a right to confront the victims with their medical 
records. (R, pp.368-369.) Marks does not, however, pursue this claim on 
appeal. (Appellant's Brief, p.6 n.3.) 
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[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Would I be allowed to call Dr. Guertin to 
talk about what a standard sex assault examination is like? 
THE COURT: I don't know that he's qualified to offer that opinion 
unless he is familiar with the standard of care in Idaho. I think it's 
pretty far out there. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If he is, if he is familiar with the standard 
of care in Idaho, would I be allowed to call him then? 
THE COURT: If he can establish this was in fact a forensic 
examination. I don't think it is. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That leads to my next question then. 
believe previously when we received medical records we were not 
allowed, nor was Dr. Guertin allowed, to talk to the physician that 
did the exam. Would the Court modify that to allow my office either 
myself or my investigator or Dr. Guertin or both to speak with the 
physician that did the exams? 
THE COURT: What's the reservation about talking to the physician 
who did the exam? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That's who I would like to talk to. The 
Court ordered me not to before. And I would like to know if I can 
do that now. 
THE COURT: I am going to take that under advisement. 
(Tr., p.601, L.17 - p.602, L.16.) 
After the hearing, the court entered the following order in relation to Dr. 
Guertin's testimony and Marks' request to inquire of the examining physician: 
1. The State's motion to exclude Dr. Guertin's testimony 
regarding the credibility of the victims is granted, as it is 
improper for an expert to provide such testimony. State v. 
Johnson, 119 Idaho 852, 857, 810 P.2d 1138, 1143 (Ct. 
App. 1991). Dr. Guertin's testimony is also inadmissible as it 
pertains to his analysis of the examination performed by Dr. 
Martin, based upon the written medical records of the 
victims. This testimony is inadmissible as Dr. Guertin's 
conclusions are speculative, and the probative value of his 
testimony would be substantially outweighed by the danger 
of undue prejudice and confusion under I.R.E 403. 
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2. Defense counsel and defense counsel's investigator are 
permitted to speak with the treating physician, Dr. Martin, 
concerning the physical examination of the victims herein. 
3. Defendant's request to allow Dr. Guertin to speak to Dr. 
Martin directly is denied. 
4. Defendant's verbal supplemental motion to call Dr. Guertin 
to testify about standards for forensic sexual abuse 
examinations and medical observations which are typically 
present in victims of sexual abuse is denied, as the Court 
finds that this testimony is speculative, and the risk of unfair 
prejudice and jury confusion substantially outweigh the 
testimony's probative value under I.R.E 403. Additionally, 
this testimony would not assist the trier of fact, under I.R.E. 
702. 
(R., pp.392-393.) 
Four months later, Marks filed a motion to reconsider the exclusion of Dr. 
Guertin's testimony "on the grounds that the issues left outstanding from the 
previous hearing where the expert was excluded can now be addressed." (R., 
p.472.) In support of the motion, Marks filed an affidavit from Dr. Guertin in 
which Dr. Guertin averred he is "familiar with the medical procedures, testing 
techniques, and standards that are practiced nationally when investigating 
allegations of sexual penetration by a child," is "versed in the standard exams 
which are conducted for persons alleging sexual abuse by penetration, along 
with the information those exams will produce," and "that if proper examination is 
conducted after allegations of sexual abuse, the examiner should be able to 
identify specific changes in female anatomy." (R., p.475.) 
The court conducted another hearing on whether Dr. Guertin would be 
allowed to testify at which defense counsel argued that she was not asking Dr. 
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Guertin to "talk about the inconsistencies in the testimony" but wanted him to 
testify about "when somebody is accused of sexual assault what happens to the 
person doing the accusing, the alleged victim, the kind of exam that is accepted 
nationally" and "what happens in the female human body as a result of those 
kind of allegations, and what was not present in the examination that was done." 
(Tr., p.642, Ls.6-8, 19-21.) The court denied the motion to reconsider, stating: 
In this case the Court does not have any affidavit under oath 
with regard to the opinions the doctor is going to offer if he is 
allowed to testify. I have gone back and looked at the Johnson 
decision and I think it is on point. In Johnson the analysis was as 
follows, and that's 119 Idaho 852, a 1991 court of appeals case, 
which stands for the proposition that a doctor is not necessarily 
qualified to speak as an expert but also provides an analysis on the 
question of when a doctor's opinion invades the province of the 
jury. The analysis is lengthy in the Johnson case, but, for instance, 
it indicates by citing another case with approval a doctor is not 
qualified to offer opinions with regard to such abuse, if the doctor's 
opinion is based upon a single visit between the doctor and the 
victim. We have no visit here. 
An oral history by the doctor elicited from the victim. We 
have some limited oral history from the medical records of Dr. 
Martin. 
A physical finding of the absence of a hymen. That existed 
at least as to one of the children. 
And that the victim became upset and frightened with the 
doctor when the pelvic exam was started. 
That physician was not qualified to offer an opinion because 
he didn't have a proper factual basis with regard to what had 
occurred. And that's the thrust of this Court's decision. 
To allow this physician to offer an opinion with regard to 
whether sexual abuse occurred as alleged or not requires that the 
Court and Dr. Guertin assume Dr. Martin performed a forensic 
examination based upon allegations of sexual abuse. The medical 
records themselves do not speak to that. It indicates they were 
based upon a request for a well child check, or welfare check. 
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And, in essence, Dr. Guertin would be testifying as to what Dr. 
Martin had to have seen under the circumstances. And the Court 
finds that to be too speculative. The prejudicial value exceeds the 
risk of any probability of the likelihood of the evidence under 403, 
as the Court previously concluded. It tends to shift the focus of the 
case and try to have the doctor in essence offer testimony that Dr. 
Martin would have seen different things if this abuse had occurred 
as consistent with the child's -- the children's testimony. 
(Tr., p.645, L.13 - p.647, L.4.) 
Marks then asked if the court would allow Dr. Guertin to "testify about 
what the standard of practice is without talking about Dr. Martin's examination of 
[K.M.] and [B.M.]" and whether defense counsel could "speak to Dr. Martin about 
the[ ] medical records." (Tr., p.647, Ls.7-9, 12-14.) The court denied Marks' 
" request related to Dr. Guertin's testimony and, consistent with its prior written 
order, told defense counsel she was "free to contact" Dr. Martin but stated it 
would not "order her to speak to" defense counsel, assuming Dr. Martin would 
"assert a HIPPA [sic] rule." (Tr., p.647, Ls.11, 15-17.) 
On appeal, Marks argues the district court "erred, and violated his 
constitutional rights" in excluding Dr. Guertin's testimony and that the "court's 
reliance on Johnson was misplaced." (Appellant's Brief, pp.4, 11.) Application 
of the law to the facts presented to the district court shows otherwise. 
Expert testimony is only admissible if it "assist[s] the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." State v. Joslin, 145 
Idaho 75, 81, 175 P.3d 764, 770 (2007) (quotations omitted); see also I.R.E. 
702. "[A] witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." I.R.E. 
702. "The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an 
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opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at 
or before the hearing." !.R.E. 703. 
In essence, Marks wanted Dr. Geurtin to testify about what he believed 
Dr. Martin's examination of K.M. would have entailed based on "national 
standards" and his opinion, based on reviewing the medical records, that K.M. 
was not abused in the manner she claimed because he would have expected Dr. 
Martin's findings to be different if K.M. was telling the truth.5 The fundamental 
flaw in Dr. Guertin's proposed testimony was that he lacked any foundation for 
his opinions about what Dr. Martin did and saw during her examination of K.M.; 
or, as characterized by the district court, Dr. Guertin's testimony was entirely 
speculative. (Tr., p.646, Ls.20-23.) While Dr. Guertin may have the ability to be 
qualified as an expert on issues involving child sexual abuse including the ability 
to offer opinions about standard medical examinations that are conducted in 
such cases and physical findings that may be indicative of child abuse, he had 
no basis for offering an opinion on whether Dr. Martin actually examined K.M.'s 
hymen. Just because he expected her to, does not mean she did and whether 
5 Because C.M. was not examined, Dr. Guertin could not have an opinion on the 
issue. Nor could Dr. Guertin have a relevant opinion about the findings during 
B.K.M.'s exam because, at the time B.K.M. met with Dr. Martin, she denied any 
abuse and, according to the report, Dr. Martin did not perform an anal or genital 
exam on her. With respect to B.M., Dr. Guertin stated in his letter that the 
"importance" of her "examination is that it is consistent with her history that there 
was no penile/vaginal sexual activity" and that "the physical examination neither 
confirms nor negates [her] allegations." (R., p.347.) As such, Dr. Guertin would 
presumably not offer an opinion that the physical findings in relation to B.M.'s 
exam did not support her allegations. Thus, the only medical records Dr. Guertin 
could opine about in terms of the type of exam that "should" have been done and 
what the record "should" reflect relate to K.M. The state's argument will be 
limited accordingly. 
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she acted in compliance with "national standards" was irrelevant. See !.R.E. 401 
(defining relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence"). 
As for Dr. Martin's findings on physically examining K.M., the only "facts or 
data" known to Dr. Guertin was what is contained in Dr. Martin's report. The 
relevant part of that report states: "Genital findings were normal externally, 
unable to perform speculum exam due to patient's anxiety and refusal." 
(Confidential Exhibit.) Dr. Guertin found this conclusion "very important" 
because, according to him, he would have "expected" "significant injury" based 
on the abuse described by K.M. (R., p.347.) Specifically, Dr. Guertin noted a 
"[t]ypical injury in a child that young would have included a complete transection 
of the hymen" and, he stated, "[t]ransections of the hymen persist" or, "[i]n other 
words, the expected transection would have or should have still been there." (R., 
p.347.) Although Dr. Guertin believes Dr. Martin's examination of K.M.'s external 
genitalia "would have included an examination of the hymen" (R., p.347) he has 
no actual knowledge that it did. In fact, the medical record reflects Dr. Martin 
had difficulty in fully examining K.M.'s genitalia due to K.M.'s "anxiety and 
refusal" to allow insertion of a speculum. (Confidential Exhibit.) While Dr. 
Guertin apparently interprets this as a "notable" indication that K.M. was lying 
given her claims of "recurrent episodes of penile/vaginal intercourse, extending 
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up through age 13 years or so" (R., p.3476), though the state can think of a 
number of reasons for K.M.'s reaction that have no bearing on her credibility, 
there is no basis for concluding that Dr. Martin did not actually experience that 
resistance. Indeed, the medical records indicate an effort to schedule K.M. for 
examination under anesthesia as a result of Dr. Martin's difficulty - a point Dr. 
Guertin acknowledges, even stating the "results of that examination are 
important to know." (R., pp.347-348.) Regardless, even if Dr. Martin's 
examination of the external genitalia should have included the hymen, her 
performance was not at issue and what she should or should not have done as 
part of the examination is, as previously noted, irrelevant. If Marks wished to 
explore the scope of Dr. Martin's examination and her precise findings, he should 
have subpoenaed her.7 
Also missing from Dr. Guertin's proffered opinion is any basis for 
concluding that Dr. Martin's characterization of K.M.'s genitalia as "normal 
externally" means K.M.'s hymen showed no signs of penile penetration. That an 
"examiner should be able to identify specific changes in female anatomy" (R., 
p.475) does not necessarily mean any such change places the anatomy outside 
6 Dr. Guertin's letter actually misstates the medical record. He writes, "in a child 
who had recurrent episodes of penile/vaginal intercourse, extending up through 
age 13 years or so, it would be expected that a speculum could be admitted 
without discomfort." (R., p.347 (emphasis added).) Unless Dr. Guertin equates 
"discomfort" with "[a]nxiety and refusal," as opposed to pain, the medical records 
do not support his statement. 
7 The state does not interpret the district court's refusal to "order" Dr. Martin to 
"talk" to counsel as a prohibition on subpoenaing her to testify at trial. Moreover, 
the state did not find any indication in the record that Dr. Martin actually refused 
to talk to counsel. 
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of the normal range or that any given examiner will document changes even if 
those changes are considered normal. Surely sexually active females who have 
a transected hymen as a result of that activity will still have genitalia that are 
considered "normal." 
Significantly, Dr. Martin's report does not conclude that K.M. was not 
abused. Instead, in the "Assessment" portion of her report, Dr. Martin wrote: 
"Sexual abuse by dad[.]" (Confidential Exhibit.) Thus, the one professional who 
actually examined K.M. did not conclude, as Dr. Guertin has without ever seeing 
the child, that K.M. was not abused. It was this lack of foundation for Dr. 
Guertin's opinion that was at the core of the district court's decision to exclude it. 
Marks also contends that, even assuming the Rules of Evidence 
"somehow bar the presentation of Dr. Guertin's testimony, any such rule or rules 
may not be applied to exclude the proffered testimony under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution . because Dr. 
Guertin's testimony was 'relevant,' 'material,' and 'vital' to the defense." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.18.) Marks is incorrect. 
Marks' constitutional argument is based on general principles recognized 
by the Supreme Court that a criminal defendant has a right to present a defense, 
a principle the state does not, and would not, dispute. Marks, however, fails to 
acknowledge the equally well-established principle that "[t]he Rules of Evidence 
embody the balancing test which safeguards a defendant's constitutional right to 
present a defense along with protection of the state's interest in the integrity of 
the criminal trial process." State v. Meister 148 Idaho 236, 240, 220 P.3d 1055, 
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1059 (2009). Thus, if evidence is deemed inadmissible under the applicable 
rules, the constitutional right to present a defense does not override exclusion of 
the evidence. kL.; see State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, _, 264 P.3d 54, 59 
(2011) (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (noting the 
defendant's failure to provide "any authority holding that the exclusion of 
irrelevant evidence violates a defendant's right to confront the witnesses against 
him"). As recently reiterated by the Supreme Court: "The Constitution 
guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete 
defense, but we have also recognized that state and federal rulemakers have 
broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from 
criminal trials." Nevada v. Jackson, 133 S.Ct. 1990, 1992 (2013) (citations, 
quotations and brackets omitted). Marks' claimed constitutional violation in 
relation to the exclusion of Dr. Guertin's testimony fails. 
D. Even If Marks Can Establish Error In The Exclusion Of Dr. Guertin's 
Testimony, The Error Is Harmless 
Even if the district court erred in denying Marks' request to have Dr. 
Guertin testify that they physical findings in K.M.'s exam were inconsistent with 
her claim of vaginal penetration, any such error is harmless. 
"If the Court finds that the district court abused its discretion in admitting 
or excluding the evidence, then the Court must declare a belief beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the outcome of the trial, in order to 
find that the error was harmless and not reversible." State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho • 
584, _, 301 P.3d 242, 256 (2013) (citation omitted). "In other words, the error 
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is harmless if the Court finds that the result would be the same without the error." 
There was overwhelming evidence presented at trial that Marks sexually 
abused all four of his daughters.8 Moreover, K.M. alleged more than just vaginal 
penetration. She also testified that Marks also engaged in anal and oral sex with 
her and the lewd conduct involving K.M. was charged in the alternative. (Tr., 
p.900, L.12 - p.901, L.7.) Given the scope and extent of the allegations by all of 
Marks' victims, this Court can easily conclude the result would have been the 
same even if the jury heard Dr. Guertin's testimony about K.M. Compare State 
v. Aguilar, 154 Idaho 201, _, 296 P.3d 407, 411 (Ct. App. 2012) (finding 
erroneous admission of expert testimony harmless in part "the evidence adduced 
at trial was overwhelming that Aguilar committed lewd conduct with three minors 
under the age of sixteen,,).9 
8 As will be discussed in Section II, infra, Marks' other daughter, B.K.M. testified 
pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) as Marks' lewd conduct perpetrated on her was 
charged in a separate case due to the timing of B.K.M.'s disclosure, which was 
approximately one year after her sisters' disclosures. 
9 Even if the Court cannot find the error harmless, the state submits this would 
only impact the jury's verdict with respect to K.M. for the reasons noted in 
footnote 5, supra. 
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II. 
Marks Has Failed To Establish Error In The District Court's Admission Of 404(b) 
Evidence Relating To Marks' Abuse Of His Daughter, B.K.M. 
A. Introduction 
Although Marks was not charged in this case with sexually molesting his 
third biological daughter, B.K.M.,10 prior to the second trial, the state filed a 
notice of intent to introduce evidence that Marks also molested her. (Notice of 
Intent to to [sic] Use I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence ("Notice of Intent") (augmentation).11) 
Marks filed an objection "on the grounds that the 404(b) is not proper material 
[sic]." (R., pA70.) After a hearing on the issue, the court admitted the evidence. 
(Tr., p.654, Ls.11-25.) Marks contends on appeal that this ruling was erroneous, 
claiming the court failed to "engage[e] in the analysis and review required under 
applicable legal standards" and "even assuming such compliance, the prior acts 
were irrelevant propensity evidence inadmissible under Rule 404." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.18.) To the contrary, review of the applicable legal standards shows the 
district court did not err in its analysis nor in its conclusion that the evidence was 
admissible. 
10 Because two of Marks' daughters have the initials B.M., consistent with the 
Appellant's Brief, the state will refer to the allegations involving the daughter who 
was the subject of the 404(b) evidence as "B.K.M." Although Marks engaged in 
similar conduct with B.K.M., she did not disclose it until later at which time the 
state charged Marks with lewd conduct against B.K.M. in a separate case. (See 
Tr., p.609, L.24 - p.61 0, LA, p.626, LsA-11; see generally Tr., pp.650-654.) The 
state, at one point, sought to consolidate the cases, but ultimately withdrew that 
motion for scheduling reasons. (See R., p.18; see generally 7/22/20011 Tr.) 
11 Contemporaneous with this brief, the state filed a motion to augment the 
record with the state's Notice of Intent, filed July 8, 2011, as well as the State's 
Response to Defendant's Motion to Exclude Rule 404(b) Evidence, filed July 29, 
2011. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
Rulings under !.R.E. 404(b) are reviewed under a bifurcated standard: 
whether the evidence is admissible for a purpose other than propensity is given 
free review while the determination of whether the probative value of the 
evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49,51,205 P.3d 
1185, 1187 (2009). 
C. Marks Has Failed To Show Error In The Admission Of B.K.M.'s Testimony 
At trial, B.K.M. testified, similar to her siblings, that Marks began sexually 
abusing her when she was eight- or nine-years old. (Tr., p.1002, L.12 - p.1 005, 
L.22.) B.K.M. specifically described specific instances of sexual abuse and 
testified the abuse occurred until she was 13-years-old, at which time she told 
Marks "it had to stop." (Tr., p.1006, LsA-16.) B.K.M. did not disclose the abuse 
at the time it was occurring or at the same time her sisters did; rather, she first 
disclosed the abuse in counseling approximately one year after Marks was 
arrested. (Tr., p.1 011, L.11 - p.1 012, L.3.) 
Marks proffers two claims of error in relation to the district court's decision 
to admit B.K.M.'s testimony: (1) the district court failed to "engag[e] in the 
analysis and review required under applicable legal standards," and (2) even if 
the court engaged in the required analysis, it erred in admitting B.K.M.'s 
testimony." (Appellant's Brief, p.18.) Both of Marks' arguments fail. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) states: 
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Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible 
to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person 
acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for 
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident, provided that the prosecution in a criminal case shall file 
and serve notice reasonably in advance of trial ... , of the general 
nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
Thus, although evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to 
prove a defendant's criminal propensity, "such evidence may be admissible for a 
purpose other than that prohibited by !.R.E. 404(b)." State v. Gomez, 151 Idaho 
146, 150, 254 P.3d 47, 51 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Avila, 137 Idaho 410, 
412, 49 P.3d 1260, 1262 (Ct. App. 2002)). ''The enumerated 'other purposes' for 
which evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts may be admitted is not 
exhaustive." State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 18, 878 P.2d 188, 192 (Ct. App. 
1994) (citations omitted). 
"In determining the admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts, the 
Supreme Court has utilized a two-tiered analysis." Gomez, 151 Idaho at 150, 
254 P.3d at 51. "The first tier involves a two-part inquiry: (1) whether there is 
sufficient evidence to establish the prior bad acts as fact; and (2) whether the 
prior bad acts are relevant to a material disputed issue concerning the crime 
charged, other than propensity." kL (citing State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 
P.3d 1185, 1188 (2009)). The appellate court will defer to the trial court's factual 
determination that there is sufficient evidence to establish the prior bad act as 
fact if it is supported by SUbstantial and competent evidence but will review any 
relevancy determination de novo. Gomez, 151 Idaho at 150, 254 P.3d at 51 
(citations omitted). 
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With respect to his claim that the district court failed to engage in the 
proper analysis, Marks specifically argues the court "skipped the first step of the 
analysis when it failed to make a finding as to whether there was sufficient 
evidence to establish the fact of the other crime." (Appellant's Brief, p.21.) The 
Idaho Court of Appeals has held, "the district court is only required to make a 
specific articulation as to whether the prior conduct occurred if that question is 
squarely at issue. If the question is at issue, a specific articulation is necessary 
for the determination of relevance." Gomez, 151 Idaho at 151, 254 P.3d at 52 
(citing Cooke v. State, 149 Idaho 233,240,233 P.3d 164, 171 (Ct. App. 2010)). 
Marks contends a specific articulation was required because, he asserts, 
whether the abuse of B.K.M. occurred was put at issue when he "questioned the 
validity of the proffered evidence." (Appellant's Brief, pp.21-22 n.12.) 
The "proffered evidence" was "submitted under seal as an attachment" to 
the State's Response to Defendant's Motion to Exclude Rule 404(b) Evidence 
("404(b) Brief") and included the reports identified in the state's 404(b) notice and 
"a recording from the preliminary hearing in which [B.K.M.] testified." 
(Augmentation. 12) At the 404(b) hearing, counsel for Marks argued that B. K.M.'s 
testimony was "propensity evidence" that did not "meet[ ] the 404(b) accepted 
12 As previously noted, contemporaneous with this brief, the state filed a motion 
to augment the record with the State's response to Defendant's Motion to 
Exclude Rule 404(b) Evidence. The reports submitted under seal as part of the 
state's 404(b) Brief are not included nor is the recording of the preliminary 
hearing referenced therein. However, missing portions of the record are 
presumed to support the district court's decision. State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 
541, 835 P .2d 1349, 1352 (Ct. App. 1992) (missing portions of the record are 
presumed to support the actions of the court below). 
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values" and, even if it did, it was "far more prejudicial" than probative. 13 (Tr., 
p.652, Ls.1-5.) Counsel for Marks then argued: 
Your Honor, I think that the Court also has the ability to 
exclude the evidence just based on fairness to Mr. Marks. The 
Court has long been on this case, and if we look at this particular 
case, the allegations that [B.K.M.] now makes and did not at first, 
the Court is well aware that she was questioned and said nothing 
happened to her. It took a year. And I think we were at a hung jury 
when she decided something did happen to her and then talked to 
law enforcement. It took the state another eight to ten months to 
bother to file charges, even though the police report had been 
made. 
Your Honor, this is a situation where, if the state wanted that 
evidence in, that charge could have been joined with these 
charges. We would have argued that in a different way. That 
certainly is something that could be done. It is not Mr. Marks' fault 
that the state sat on those charges for months and months and 
months and then filed them late. We went through the process of 
are we going to join that charge with these charges. We couldn't 
do it and get our subpoenas done on the week that Judge Luster 
could have then heard the case, so we are in this place where Mr. 
Marks is set for trial in three counts with you next week. The 
charge with [B.K.M.] the state now wants to use with as 404(b) is 
going to happen sometime in the future. 
In think that is unfair prejudice to Mr. Marks to allow her 
testimony to come into this trial. The jury is not going to be skilled 
in the legal standards. It will be used just simply as propensity 
evidence by them. And it is just plain not fair to let it come in in this 
fashion. We would ask the Court to exclude [B.K.M.'s] testimony 
from this trial. 
(Tr., p.652, L.12 - p.653, L.18.) 
Marks cites the five lines italicized in the foregoing argument by trial 
counsel to support his claim that he "questioned the validity of the proffered 
13 Marks' written objection, filed prior to the hearing and in response to the state's 
initial notice, only objected "to the state using 404(b) evidence on the grounds 
that the 404(b) is not proper materiaL" (R., p.470.) 
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evidence." (Appellant's Brief, pp.21-22 n.12.) When read in context, the five 
lines upon which Marks relies do not support his assertion that he put the 
question of whether the abuse occurred at issue, much less squarely at issue. 
As such, Marks has failed to show error in the district court's failure to specifically 
find there was sufficient evidence to establish the abuse of B.K.M. as "fact." 
Gomez, supra. Even if trial counsel's arguments were sufficient to place the 
question at issue, Marks has failed to articulate any reason the information 
provided in support of the 404(b) Brief and the fact that a court found probable 
cause to bind Marks over for lewd conduct involving B.K.M. was not sufficient 
evidence from which a "reasonable jury could believe that the conduct actually 
occurred." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667 n.2, 227 P.3d 918, 921 n.2 
(2010) (citations omitted). 
Marks' second claim of error in relation to B.K.M.'s testimony is that the 
court "failed to conduct the type of careful examination mandated by the Idaho 
Supreme Court with respect to whether the testimony of [B.K.M.] met the 
requirements of admissibility of prior acts evidence." (Appellant's Brief, p.22.) 
According to Marks, the district court abused its discretion because, he argues, 
the court's "reasoning was conclusory" and therefore an abuse of discretion. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.22.) Marks cites no authority for the proposition that a 
district court is required to provide a detailed "analysis" of its reasoning for 
admitting 404(b) evidence or risk an appellate conclusion that it abused its 
discretion. (See generally Appellant's Brief, p.22.) Indeed, such a requirement 
is inconsistent with the well-settled principle that relevance is a question of law 
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freely reviewed by this Court. Gomez, 151 Idaho at 150, 254 P.3d at 150 
("Whether evidence is relevant is an issue of law.") 
In this case, in deciding B.K.M.'s testimony would be admissible, the 
district court concluded "[i]t tend[ed] to show motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, common scheme or plan." (Tr., p.654, Ls.20-21.) The court later 
instructed the jury prior to B.K.M.'s testimony that the evidence could only be 
considered "for the limited purpose of proving the defendant's opportunity, intent, 
or knowledge." (Tr., p.1000, Ls.20-22.) It is unclear whether the district court's 
limiting instruction reflected a modification of its pre-trial ruling or whether the 
court viewed "knowledge" and "common scheme or plan" as synonymous. See 
Grist, 147 Idaho at 54, 205 P.3d at 1190 ("evidence may be admissible for 
certain purposes, including 'preparation, plan, knowledge, [and] identity, which 
purposes are most frequently grouped together under the rubric of 'common 
scheme or plan"') (brackets original). Either way, for the reasons set forth below, 
Marks has failed to show error in the admission of B.K.M.'s testimony. 
On appeal, Marks appears to challenge only the district court's initial 
finding that the evidence was proper to show common scheme or plan. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.22 (noting court failed to provide analysis for "why or how 
the prior act evidence was admissible as common scheme or plan"), p.24 
("evidence that Mr. Marks may have sexually abused another of his daughters by 
engaging in similar conduct with her is not relevant in establishing a common 
scheme or plan").) Because "common scheme or plan" was not the only 
permissible purpose cited by the district court, and the evidence may not 
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ultimately have been admitted for this purpose anyway given the limiting 
instruction, this Court may affirm the admission of the evidence on the 
unchallenged bases. State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366, 956 P.2d 1311, 
1313 (Ct. App. 1998) (where a basis for a ruling by a district court is 
unchallenged on appeal, appellate court will affirm on the unchallenged basis). 
Even if this Court addresses the merits of whether B.K.M.'s testimony was 
relevant for a proper purpose under I.R.E. 404(b), Marks' claim that it was not 
fails. B.K.M.'s testimony was relevant for at least two reasons - to show 
opportunity and common scheme, or plan, which rebutted Marks' defenses. 
A significant part of Marks' defense centered around a claim that he 
lacked the opportunity to have sex with his daughters. During her opening 
statement, defense counsel told the jury there were "a lot of people in and out of 
the [Marks'] house" (Tr., p.786, L.8) and stated: 
[Marks] has had a lot of time to think and to think back and 
to think of all the jobs he had, all the hours he worked ... long 
hours he worked at [his] job. To think back of all the people talking 
about a six-year time span, seven-year time span, thinking of all the 
people who had been through his house, his brother Rick and his 
brother's wife, Donita, and their children, his niece and (inaudible), 
they lived there at the house. How could the girls say something 
like this when there was no opportunity for him to do it? He didn't 
do this. 
He thought about the friends that they had had through the 
years, the extra kids that had been in the house, the adoption 
process, the school counselor that lived down the street, the times 
the kids had been to the doctor. Why would they make these 
allegations? 
[Marks'] emotions ranged from anger, upset, hurt. He's 
here, he's here to tell you about all of those years, all of the people 
that came in and out of the house, all of the friends and relatives, 
all of the jobs he had, all of the hours he worked, how much he 
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loves his children but, most of all, he did not touch anyone of those 
girls inappropriately. 
(Tr., p.787, L.23 - p.788, L.20). 
Consistent with the theme presented in his opening statement, Marks 
called a number of witnesses to support his claim of lack of opportunity. Marks' 
mother testified she never saw Marks take the girls in the bedroom and lock the 
door. (Tr., p.1070, L.23 - p.1071, L.2.) Marks' niece testified that she lived with 
the Marks family twice and never saw him take any of the girls into his room. 
(Tr., p.1076, L.19 - p.1080, L.15.) Marks' brother, Richard, also testified that 
approximately seven years prior, he lived with Marks for "about six, seven 
months" and that Marks worked "16 hours a day, seven days a week" and that 
both his wife and Marks' wife "basically stayed home" with the children. (Tr., 
p.1085, L.20 - p.1 088, L.2.) In addition, Richard testified his three children were 
staying at the house as well. (Tr., p.1088, Ls.9-13.) Another niece testified that 
she, too, lived with the Marks for a period of time and that Marks was "always at 
work" and she never saw him take "one of the girls into his room." (Tr., p.1 091, 
L.10 - p.1092, L.20.) Marks called two additional witnesses - one of his 
daughters' friends and her mother - who also claimed they never saw Marks take 
one of the girls into his room. (Tr., p.1095, L.5 - p.1 096, L.17, p.11 02, Ls.2-24.) 
Finally, Marks himself testified and said he worked 10-12 hours a day anywhere 
from six to seven days a week depending on the job - although he admitted 
there was a period of time when he was laid off for several months. (Tr., p.1195, 
Ls.22-24, p.1197, L.23 - p.1198, L.10, p.1203, Ls.1-5, p.1204, L.22 - p.1205, 
L.5.) 
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During closing argument, defense counsel reiterated the theme that Marks 
"worked a lot, really, really long hours" and there were a number of people who 
lived with the family who never saw "anything happen." (Tr., p.1278, Ls.3-12, 
p.1278, L.23 - p.1284, L.1.) Defense counsel's closing argument included the 
following statement: "There are only 24 hours in the day. A person has to sleep 
some of them, eat, take a shower, clean the house and mows the lawn. But 
when a person works a lot of hours that makes them less available. That makes 
the allegations very unlikely." (Tr., p.1284, Ls.2-6.) 
Given Marks' claim that he lacked the opportunity to sexually offend 
against his daughters, as they claimed, B.K.M.'s testimony was relevant to 
corroborate her sisters' assertions to the contrary. Compare Gomez, 151 Idaho 
at 154, 254 P .3d at 55 (finding 404(b) evidence "tended to prove that Gomez had 
the opportunity to commit the charged crime" and was "relevant to the [victim's] 
credibility"). Marks has not acknowledged that the testimony was admitted, in 
part, to prove opportunity, much less established admission on this basis was 
erroneous. 
As noted, Marks has only argued that B.K.M.'s testimony was not relevant 
to show a common scheme or plan. Marks is incorrect. Although this Court can 
affirm the admission of B.K.M.'s testimony solely on the basis that it was 
appropriate to show opportunity, her testimony was also relevant to establish a 
common scheme or plan involving Marks sexually molesting each of his 
daughters starting when they were around eight-years-old. "Where relevant to 
the credibility of the parties, evidence of a common criminal design is 
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admissible." State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 54, 205 P.3d 1185, 1190 (2009) 
(quoting State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743,746,819 P.2d 1143,1146 (1991). "If 
the common scheme or plan rubric is to be used, there must be common 
characteristics that go 'beyond merely showing a criminal propensity.'" State v. 
Pepcorn, 152 Idaho 678, 689, 273 P.3d 1271, 1282 (2012) (quoting Johnson, 
148 Idaho at 668, 227 P.3d at 922). "In other words, at a minimum, there must 
be evidence of a common scheme or plan beyond the bare fact that sexual 
misconduct has occurred with children in the past." Johnson, 148 Idaho at 668, 
227 P.3d at 922. "The events must be linked by common characteristics that go 
beyond merely showing a criminal propensity and instead must objectively tend 
to establish that the same person committed all the acts." !fL 
Marks argues that "evidence that [he] may have sexually abused another 
of his daughters by engaging in similar conduct with her is not relevant in 
establishing a common scheme or plan to abuse the three victims in this case." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.24.) In support of this assertion, Marks relies on the Idaho 
Supreme Court's opinion in Johnson. (Appellant's Brief, p.24.) A review of 
Johnson reveals significant differences between that case and this one. 
In Johnson, the sate charged the defendant with three counts of lewd 
conduct for offenses perpetrated against his daughter "who was between six and 
seven years old at the time of the charged conduct." 148 Idaho at 666,227 P.3d 
at 920. The trial court permitted the state to introduce evidence, over Johnson's 
objection, that he "had molested his younger sister when she was approximately 
eight years old and he was between fifteen and sixteen." !fL On appeal, the 
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Idaho Supreme Court concluded the admission of evidence that Johnson 
previously molested his sister was improper, finding it was "irrelevant to the 
charged conduct under I.R.E. 404(b)." & at 668, 227 P.3d at 922 (capitalization 
altered). Although the trial court identified three characteristics linking the two 
victims - (1) both victims were the same age; (2) both victims viewed Johnson as 
an authority figure; and (3) in both cases, Johnson asked the victim to touch his 
penis - the Court found these similarities "are sadly far too unremarkable to 
demonstrate a 'common scheme or plan' in Johnson's behavior." & at 669,227 
P.3d at 923. According to the Court, "The facts that the two victims in this case 
are juvenile females and that Johnson is a family member are precisely what 
make these incidents unfortunately quite ordinary." & 
Unlike in Johnson, Marks' abuse of B.K.M. was not a prior event with no 
temporal connection to or relationship with the molestation of his three other 
daughters. Instead, it was integral to a pattern of behavior by Marks involving 
him beginning to sexually abuse each daughter once they reached a certain age. 
And, the abuse Marks perpetrated on all of his daughters was similar in nature. 14 
14 With respect to the "similarities supporting the common scheme or plan 
justification," Marks contends it is "worth noting that, while two of the named 
victims claimed that the first instance of abuse occurred when all three were 
present, B.K.M. testified that the abuse first occurred when she and Mr. Marks 
were alone and never involved anyone else." (Appellant's Brief, p.24 (citations 
and footnote omitted).) The state fails to see the significance in this. The three 
victims involved in the "first instance" of abuse were B.M., K.M., and C.M., all of 
whom were born in July 1994, and were, therefore, the same age when Marks 
abused them together. B.K.M., on the other hand, was born in 1996 and, given 
that Marks began abusing his daughters when they turned eight-years-old, he did 
not start abusing her until two years later. Moreover, after the first incident 
involving the three older girls, it appears many of Marks' subsequent acts of lewd 
conduct were perpetrated on the girls individually rather than as a group. 
29 
B.K.M.'s testimony also refuted Marks' implication that B.M. and K.M., who were 
twins, manufactured the allegations because Marks grounded K.M. for going to a 
sleepover where there was alcohol15 and were somehow persuaded or 
influenced by a friend's mother, Deanna, who had previously disclosed her own 
abuse to them, to claim they were abused as well. (See Tr., p.832, L.11 - p.836, 
L.22, p.936, L.5 - p.937, L.11, p.1288, L.24 - p.1291, L.5.) It also refuted the 
argument that C. M. lied about the abuse because she hated Marks, "not 
because he molested her for a lot of years," but "because he argues and fights 
with her and grounds her." (Tr. p.1288, Ls.17-23.) B.K.M.'s testimony 
establishes Marks planned to, and did, sexually abuse all of his daughters and 
directly refutes Marks' claim at trial that three of the four daughters lied about it 
out of spite because they were upset about being in trouble and/or had the story 
planted in their heads by Deanna. Marks' claim that B.K.M.'s testimony was only 
relevant to show propensity is belied by the record. 
Marks further contends "the probative value of the evidence was minimal 
considering the fact that the State already had the testimony of three witnesses 
who all reported similar instances of abuse comprising the accusations for which 
[he] was on triaL" (Appellant's Brief, p.22.) Marks complains this "minimal 
probative value ... was substantially outweighed by the prejudice suffered ... in 
a jury hearing of alleged bad acts about which the jury was not asked to reach a 
verdict." (Appellant's Brief, p.22.) Marks has failed to show the district court 
15 Counsel even repeated this claim at sentencing in asking the court to 
"consider that these allegations arose after the girls were disciplined for 
drinking." (Tr., p.1334, Ls.1214.) 
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abused its discretion in weighing the probative value of the evidence against its 
potential for unfair prejudice. 
Pursuant to I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if, in the 
district court's discretion, the danger of unfair prejudice -- which is the tendency 
to suggest a decision on an improper basis -- substantially outweighs the 
probative value of the evidence. State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 
720, 722 (2010); State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 907 (Ct. 
App. 1994); State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651,656,862 P.2d 343, 348 (Ct. App. 
1993). Rule 403 does not offer protection against evidence that is merely 
prejudicial in the sense of being detrimental to a party's case. See State v. 
Leavitt, 116 Idaho 285, 290, 775 P.2d 599, 604 (1989) ("Certainly that evidence 
was prejudicial to the defendant, however, almost all evidence in a criminal trial 
is demonstrably admitted to prove the case of the state, and thus results in 
prejudice to a defendant."). Rather, the rule protects only against evidence that 
is unfairly prejudicial, that is, evidence that tends to suggest a decision on an 
improper basis. Floyd, 125 Idaho at 654, 873 P.2d at 908. The weighing 
required under Rule 403 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Grist, 147 Idaho 
at 51,205 P.3d at 1187. 
The district court correctly found B.K.M.'s testimony was not unfairly 
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prejudicial. 16 (Tr., p.654, Ls.21-24.) For the reasons already stated, and 
contrary to Marks' claim on appeal, the probative value of B.K.M.'s testimony 
was high since it refuted Marks' claims of lack of opportunity and showed a 
common scheme or plan to sexually abuse his daughters, which contradicted his 
assertions that the claims were made, with Deanna's encouragement, because 
the girls were angry. On the other hand, the prejudicial effect was minimal given 
that B.K.M.'s testimony about Marks' behavior was essentially no different than 
her sisters' testimony. Moreover, prior to B.K.M.'s testimony, the court instructed 
the jury as follows: 
... [L]adies and gentlemen, you are instructed that evidence is 
about to be introduced for the purpose of showing that the 
defendant committed crimes or acts other than that for which the 
defendant is on tria\. Such evidence, if believed, is not to be 
considered by you to prove the defendant's character or that the 
defendant has a disposition to commit crimes. Such evidence may 
be considered by you only for the limited purpose of proving the 
defendant's opportunity, intent, or knowledge. 
(Tr., p.1000, Ls.14-22.) 
Given the court's limiting instruction and the nature and scope of the non-
404(b) evidence presented, it cannot be said that there was any legitimate risk 
that the jury used B.K.M.'s testimony to decide Marks' guilt on an improper basis. 
Marks has failed to show the district court abused its discretion in finding 
B.K.M.'s testimony was not unfairly prejudicial. 
16 The transcript reads: "But the prejudice is not substantially outweighed by the 
probative value." (Tr., p.654, Ls.23-24.) Because the court found the evidence 
admissible, it is apparent this is either an error in the transcript or an accidental 
misstatement by the court since the standard should be stated in the reverse -
the probative value must be substantially outweighed by the prejudice. I.R.E. 
403. 
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Even if the Court concludes the district court erred in allowing B.K.M. to 
testify, any error was harmless given the overwhelming nature of the evidence 
from the other daughters. As noted by the district court at sentencing, the 
daughters' testimony was credible and corroborated by other evidence. (Tr., 
p.1345, L.17 - p.1347, L.13.) And, as further noted by the district court at the 
Rule 35 hearing, the testimony at trial was "overwhelming" and "compelling." 
(Tr., p.1375, Ls.18-20.) Thus, to the extent error occurred with respect to 
B.K.M., the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
III. 
Marks Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Marks "asserts that, given any view of the facts," his sentences are 
excessive "in light of the mitigating circumstances present in his case, especially 
the fact that he passed two polygraph examinations concerning the charges." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.25.) Marks also complains the district court abused its 
discretion in denying his Rule 35 motion. (Appellant' Brief, pp.29-31.) 
Application of the correct legal standards to the facts of this case show Marks 
has failed to establish the district court abused its sentencing discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. 
Moore, 131 Idaho 814,823,965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 
125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994)). 
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C. Marks Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Imposing Concurrent Unified Life Sentences With 30 Years Fixed 
Following The Jury Verdicts Finding Him Guilty Of Engaging In Lewd 
Conduct With Three Of His Daughters 
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard considering the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 
722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 
50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 
(2007)). Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the 
burden of demonstrating it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 
Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 
831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the appellant must show the 
sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho 
at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, however, if it appears 
necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the 
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. J..st. 
"[T]he most fundamental requirement [of sentencing] is reasonableness." 
State v. Miller,151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) (quotations and 
citation omitted). "When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court 
will make an independent examination of the record, "having regard to the nature 
of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public 
interest." J..st. A review of the record demonstrates that concurrent fixed life 
sentences with 30 years fixed imposed for Marks' conduct in engaging in lewd 
conduct with his daughters is more than reasonable. Marks has failed to 
establish otherwise. 
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In imposing sentence, the district court discussed, in detail, the objectives 
of sentencing and how each factored into its decision. (Tr., p.1349, L.3 -
p.1353, L.2.) The court noted "the most important factor here is protection of the 
public" and stated a belief it could "craft a sentence that reasonably protects the 
public while giving [Marks] a chance to get out." (Tr., p.1352, LsA-5, p.1352, 
L.25 - p.1353, L.2.) That sentence is life with 30 years fixed. (Tr., p.1354, LS.7-
9.) The court reasoned that a lesser fixed term would place Marks at an age at 
which he could still be a "danger to the public" and the sentence imposed took 
into consideration all relevant information and gave Marks "a little bit of a carrot 
towards rehabilitation so that [he] can work towards getting out." (Tr., p.1353, 
L.22 - p.1354, L.3.) 
Marks contends the district court abused its discretion in imposing 
sentence, citing what he calls the "most important mitigating factor" - that he 
"passed two polygraph examinations, taken two years apart" and the 
polygrapher, both times, expressed an opinion that Marks was being truthful in 
his denials. (Appellant's Brief, pp.26-27.) The court was certainly aware of the 
polygraph testing, which defense counsel noted at sentencing 17 (Tr., p.1333, 
Ls.18-20), but was obviously not persuaded by the results or the polygrapher's 
opinion, nor was it required to defer to the polygrapher's opinion. Unlike the 
polygrapher, the district court presided over two trials involving Marks' daughters' 
allegations against him and the court found their testimony credible and noted 
17 Interestingly, at the subsequent Rule 35 hearing, defense counsel noted the 
polygraphs again but acknowledged it was "not relevant" that Marks passed 
them. (Tr., p.1371, L.24 - p.1372, L.2.) 
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their testimony was corroborated by other witnesses. (Tr., p.1345, L.17 -
p.1347, L.13.) The jury agreed as indicated by their verdict. That a polygrapher 
believes Marks' denials falls far short of demonstrating an abuse of discretion. 
Cf. State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873,878,253 P.3d 310, 315 (2011) ("In this 
case, although the trial court had evidence before it including the opinions of two 
well-regarded mental health professionals regarding Windom's rehabilitative 
potential, it was the judge who bore the heavy burden of evaluating whether 
Windom would actually comply with rehabilitative programming and whether 
such programming would reduce his risk of future violent behavior to an 
acceptable leveL"). 
As for the other mitigating factors cited by Marks - such as his "troubled" 
childhood, gainful employment, and the support of his family and friends 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.27 -28) - the court considered this information at 
sentencing. (Tr., p.1345, Ls.12-14, p.1354, L.5.) That Marks feels the court 
should have given them greater weight also does not establish an abuse of 
discretion. See Windom, 150 Idaho at 880,253 P.3d at 317 ("Our standard of 
review does not require (nor indeed, does it permit) us to conduct our own 
evaluation of the weight to be given each of the sentencing considerations 
(societal protection, general and specific deterrence, defendant's prospects for 
rehabilitation and societal retribution) in order to determine whether we agree 
with the district court's conclusion."). 
Marks' sentences are reasonable given any reasonable view of the facts. 
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D. Marks Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Rule 35 Motion 
Marks next asserts the district court erred in denying his request for Rule 
35 relief. (Appellant's Brief, pp.29-31.) The record shows otherwise. 
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of 
sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this Court reviews the denial 
of the motion for an abuse of discretion. Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, 159 P.3d at 
840. A court's decision not to reduce a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion subject to the well-established standards governing whether a 
sentence is excessive. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26,28,218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. 
App.2009). 
The day after the court entered judgment, Marks filed a Rule 35 motion, 
stating it was a "plea for leniency" and requesting a hearing "to present oral 
argument and/or testimony in support" of the motion." (R., pp.664, 668.) At the 
Rule 35 hearing, Marks testified that his medications changed since sentencing 
and he was told by his physician he was "out of [his] head" at the time of trial and 
sentencing,18 he had not been in "trouble" during his incarceration other than 
"two minors" while in county jail, he was in "pre-sex offender programming" and 
was open to programming, and that, according to a guardian ad litem report, 
Marks' daughters were "disappointed in the length of the sentence." (See 
generally Tr., pp.1361-1367.) 
18 Defense counsel explained that he brought up the medication change because 
Marks "doesn't think probably that he should have taken the witness stand or 
was really competent to testify." (Tr., p.1370, L.20 - p.1371, L.4.) It is unclear 
how this is relevant to Marks' request for Rule 35 relief. 
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On cross-examination, and somewhat inconsistent with his implied 
assertion that he was no longer "out of [his] head," Marks, when asked whether 
he was still denying he sexually offended against his daughters, Marks 
responded, in part, that his "brain [was] going sideways." (Tr., p.1368, L.25 -
p.1369, L.12.) In any event, Marks ultimately answered he was "admitting" he 
was found guilty at trial. (Tr., p.1369, Ls.18-23.) 
After Marks' testimony, defense counsel reiterated his "understanding" 
from the "child protection that [he was] also involved in that the girls think that the 
Court's sentence was much longer than it needed to be,,,19 and argued: 
I am concerned that Mr. Marks, and with all due respect to 
the Court was punished essentially for taking this to trial, for 
asserting his right to a trial. Mr. Marks has zero criminal history 
behind him on this case, none in all of his years. In addition, 
though not relevant, he did pass several polygraphs, full disclosure 
polygraphs, indicating his - - that he may have not done that. And I 
understand that he was convicted of that, your Honor, and I am not 
trying to downplay that. But what I am saying is these are unusual 
circumstances. 
Mr. Marks is currently in pre SOG training down three right 
now, hopefully to get him into treatment. I do not think that he 
represents a danger to the community, thought it is arguable 
whether he would even be a danger to the girls anymore at this 
time. '" I think right here we have come about as close as we 
can to an admission from Mr. Marks over what happened or what 
didn't happen. I do believe he is ready to go on any treatment. He 
has indicated that he has been a model prisoner, intends on being 
a model prisoner, and is not throwing his hands up and just saying I 
have life so I might as well not behave. He is in a unit right now 
that he can only be in if he behaves good, and he has done so. So 
I am asking the Court to reduce the sentence somewhere down 
19 Marks' representation that the "girls were disappointed in the length of the 
sentence" was based on a report that was not submitted at the Rule 35 hearing 
nor was it disclosed to the state; nevertheless, the court indicated it was "willing 
to take that for what it is worth." (Tr., p.1366, L.9-p.1367, L.11.) 
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into the 15-year period. I am also going to ask the Court to retain 
jurisdiction in this case. 
(Tr., p.1371, L.20 - p.1372, L.22.) 
The court denied Marks' request for a sentence reduction, stating: 
The Court has considered the files and records. And, in fact, I sat 
through two trials in this case. I watched the excruciating impact of 
repeated testimony by the victims. I watched Mr. Marks testify in 
absolute denial under cross-examination. 1t was apparent to the 
Court that the only concern Mr. Marks had during the trial was his 
own well-being. He showed no empathy whatsoever for the victims 
at any point. And, yes, it's true, at one point the Court agreed to 
not exceed a 15-year term [as contemplated by the binding Rule 11 
plea agreement entered into between the first and second trial]. 
But when that agreement was negotiated, it was specifically 
negotiated after the first trial resulted in a hung jury. And I 
expressly represented to Mr. Marks that I would agree to that for 
only one reason, and that reason was so that the victims didn't 
have to go through the trauma of testimony again. 
The Court in no way punished Mr. Marks for his choice to 
withdraw his plea. I allowed him to do so. Before allowing him to 
do so I warned him that if a conviction were going to result from a 
second trial, I was not going to limit myself to that 15 years. I would 
consider the testimony. I would consider his demeanor at trial. 
And I would consider the overall nature of the case. 
Rehabilitation is not possible until Mr. Marks acknowledges 
the conduct. It is a devil's choice, if you will, when you are 
convicted of a crime like this and you believe you are innocent 
which Mr. Marks may believe. . .. I ... remember the testimony at 
trial. It was overwhelming. It was compelling. The conduct 
testified to by the victims was abhorring. And there is no way in 
this Court's mind to rehabilitate Mr. Marks until he acknowledges 
guilt. 
In making the sentence and crafting the sentence the Court 
did, the Court wanted in some way to give credence to each of the 
victims in the case. The Court is also mindful of the fact that Mr. 
Marks at no point has taken any responsibility and, as I indicated, 
shown any remorse, shown any concern for anybody but himself. 
And the Court at the time of his sentencing and today is convinced 
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that the only way to protect the public is to lock Mr. Marks up for a 
substantial period of time. And I don't think he should be released 
until somebody testifies that he is not a danger. That's the basis 
for the indeterminate period .... 
The conduct for which the defendant has been convicted will 
be front and center in the lives of his victims for the rest of their 
lives. They are going to have difficulty ever trusting a man. They 
are going to have difficulty ever forming meaningful relationships or 
having normal families. It is not unusual in a case where you have 
extended periods of traumatic issues as occur in sexual abuse 
cases that the victim ultimately show empathy for the perpetrator. 
It is called Stockholm syndrome. So I don't put much weight in the 
fact that the girls think the sentence is too short [sic]. That's one 
responsibility they don't have in the court. 
Based upon the statements made by the Court in the record 
here this afternoon, I am going to deny the Rule 35 motion. 
(Tr., p.1374, L.9 - p.1376, L.24; also R., p.689 (written order denying Rule 35.) 
On appeal, Marks argues "[b]oth the spirit of the [victims' rights 
amendment to the state constitution] and the specific rights contained therein, 
require consideration of a victim's wishes even after sentence has been 
imposed." (Appellant's Brief, p.30.) According to Marks, "The failure of the 
district court to give adequate consideration to the express wishes of the victims 
was an abuse of discretion and violated the Idaho Constitution." (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.30-31.) This argument has zero merit. 
With respect to court proceedings, Article I, section 22, of the Idaho 
Constitution grants victims the right "[t]o be heard, upon request, at all criminal 
justice proceedings considering a plea of guilty, sentencing, incarceration or 
release of the defendant, unless manifest justice would result." K.M. and B.M. 
exercised those rights at the sentencing hearing and all three victims provided 
written comments to the presentence investigator. (Tr., p.1321, L.25 - p.1325, 
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L.7; PSI, pp.3-6.) At no time were the victims deprived of their rights pursuant to 
the Idaho Constitution. Indeed, the victims were not even present at the Rule 35 
hearing - instead, Marks and his counsel purported to state their position to the 
court. Most importantly, nowhere in the constitution does it state the court is 
required to give "adequate consideration" to the victims' wishes vis-a-vis 
sentencing. 
In any event, Marks cites no authority for the proposition that he can 
assert an alleged deprivation of a victim's rights on the victim's behalf and, even 
if he could, Article I, section 22(10) specifically precludes any relief "for a 
violation of the provisions of [that] section." Moreover, as aptly noted by the 
district court, it considered the victims' alleged views regarding Marks' sentences 
but the court was not bound by their wishes. The court's obligation to impose 
sentence requires consideration of the sentencing objectives established by law 
and the court is not required to defer to the recommendations of any particular 
individual. See Windom, supra. Marks' claim to the contrary fails. 
Marks has failed to show the district court abused its discretion by 
imposing concurrent unified life sentences with 30 years fixed or by refusing to 
grant Marks' Rule 35 motion. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon the jury verdicts finding Marks guilty of three counts of lewd conduct. 
DATED this 9th day of October, 2013. 
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